Osgoode Hall Review of Law
and Policy
Volume 4
Number 1 Volume 4, Number 1 (Spring 2013)

Article 1

2013

Procuring American: Canada’s New Sub-Federal
Procurement Obligations
Craig Garbe

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohrlp
Citation Information
Garbe, Craig. "Procuring American: Canada’s New Sub-Federal Procurement Obligations." Osgoode Hall Review of Law and Policy 4.1
(2014): 3-35.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohrlp/vol4/iss1/1

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Review of Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL REVIEW OF
LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 4

SPRING 2013

ISSUE 1

ARTICLE
PROCURING AMERICAN: CANADA’S NEW SUB-FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
OBLIGATIONS
Craig Garbe

*

In early 2009 the US government introduced The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a massive direction of US stimulus spending to
kickstart the US economy. The ARRA contained clauses which made some
stimulus spending at the sub-federal level conditional on the purchase of US
goods and services. While certainly not a novel American response, the
restrictive provisions of the ARRA attracted much Canadian attention. This
paper examines the current status of Canadian sub-federal procurement law,
in light of agreements reached between Canada and the US in response to the
ARRA. It argues that the Canadian response to the ARRA is problematic
based on the historical and current practice of sub-federal procurement by
the Canadian government.
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I
INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 2009, facing an economic crisis of massive
proportions, Barack Obama signed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the “ARRA”) into law. The bill,
encompassing close to 800 billion dollars in stimulus government
spending, was intended to ignite the waning American economy and
bring much needed growth to the United States.1 What it ignited,
however, was Canadian sentiment and ire. The ARRA contained
several clauses which make stimulus funding conditional on the
procurement of US manufactured goods, and these clauses prompted
strong objections from Canadian business, media, and government.2
The strong Canadian reaction to the provisions of the ARRA
extended to all levels of government, prompting meetings of
provincial premiers and correspondence from the Canadian Trade
Minister to his American counterpart.3 Eventually, Canada and the
United States entered negotiations and, on February 5, 2010,
concluded an agreement which promised to alleviate the detrimental
Buy American provisions of the ARRA for Canadian businesses, the

Agreement Between The Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States of America on Government Procurement (the
“Agreement”)4.
agreement.
1

This paper aims to deconstruct and analyze this

Micheael A. Fletcher, “Obama Leaves D.C. to Sign Stimulus Bill” The Washington

Post (18 February 2009), online:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021700
221.html>.
2 Tonda MacCharles and Les Whittinton, “Obama’s ‘Buy American’ plan blasted” The
Toronto Star (30 January 2009), online: <http://www.thestar.com/article/579557>
[MacCharles].
3 Milos Barutciski and Jesse I. Goldman, Canadian Government Moves to Counter
‘Buy American’ Protectionism, (2009) International Trade and Investment Group
Update (Bennett Jones LLP), online at: <
http://www.bennettjones.com/Images/Guides/update7464.pdf> [Barutciski]; Meeting
of the Council of the Federation, Premiers call for new Agreement with the United
States, (Ottawa: 9 June 2009), online:
<http://www.councilofthefederation.ca/pdfs/NewsRelease_BuyAmerican.pdf>
[Council June 09].

Agreement Between The Government of Canada and The Government of the United
States of America on Government Procurement, Canada and United States, 5
4
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I begin by examining the relevant context of treaties and
agreements which already bind the procurement decisions of the
various levels of Canadian government. As we will see, sub-federal
procurement is conspicuously absent from many of these agreements;
this absence calls for an examination of the Canadian policy and
platform in relation to such procurement. I also look to the relevant
provincial concerns and the business perspective in an attempt to
develop an understanding of the implications any agreement on subfederal procurement will have.
I then turn to examine the recent Buy American controversy,
and finally, the text of the Agreement itself. I analyze the reciprocal
concessions from the United States and Canada, and, drawing from
the perspectives discussed in the first half of the paper, discuss
whether or not Canada stands to receive—to borrow the term from
the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Agency—a ‘net benefit’
from the Agreement. In the end, my analysis finds that Canada's
response was reactionary and undisciplined, especially when
contrasted with the historically reserved Canadian position, and that
the exemptions realized pale in contrast to the promises given.
Furthermore, while the extent of the Canadian promises has yet to be
realized, the lion's share of gains to be had from the American
concessions are either still restricted from Canadian bidders or already
contracted to American companies.
II
THE CANADIAN SUB-FEDERAL PROCUREMENT PROCESS
i) Sub-Federal Procurement in Canadian FIPAs, NAFTA, and the
WTO GPA
Prior to entering the Agreement, Canada’s obligations to
foreign investors relating to government procurement were already
numerous. In many instances, however, exceptions to generally open
February 2010 (entered into force 16 February 2010), online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/ENG-CanadaUSA%20Government%20Procurement%20%28clean%2011%20Feb%202010%20prin
ted%29.pdf> [Agreement].
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procurement policies favoured and continue to favour Canadian
businesses and production. Understanding the rationale behind
government decisions to exclude certain sectors and procurement
agents is fundamental to understanding what is at stake in any
agreement which overturns those exclusions. In this section I review
Canadian policy and look at the current concerns which animate the
decision to enter the Agreement.
ii) Federal Planning, Policies and Prognostications
Canadian federal policy on FDI has been the subject of
contentious debate for decades. It arose as a subject of discussion
primarily following the conclusion of the Second World War, when
trade integration and multinational private firms were seen as part of
the solution to global military catastrophe. Again, a deep evaluation
of Canadian FDI policy is beyond the scope of this paper, but several
developments that have continued to influence current policy
relevant to government procurement warrant consideration. One
development was the purposeful study of FDI, which came notably in
the form of two studies, conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s:
The Watkins Report and the Gray Report.5 The Gray Report, the later
of the two, highlighted a number of potential benefits that FDI could
provide to the recipient nation—skills impartation to Canadians,
heightened competitiveness in industry, and new export markets—
but tempered these advantages with a careful analysis of the
downsides of FDI. Among these were the dangers posed by increased
vertical integration or inputs tied to a foreign economy; truncation of
key value-added elements of the business chain; worrisome cultural
practices or laws which can become de facto imported into Canada;
and the dangers inherent in sharing technology with nations who
may pose a political threat.6
The follow up to the Gray Report affirms the caution
regarding FDI that characterized Canadian decision makers.
Following the publication of the Gray Report, the Foreign Investment
Review Act (the “FIRA”) was enacted which, among other things,
A. Edward Safarian, Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of Canadian Research,
(Quebec: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1985) at 39.
6 The Honourable Herb Gray, Foreign Direct Investment in Canada, (Ottawa,
Information Canada, 1972) at 41-45 [Gray].
5
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created an agency to review foreign mergers and takeovers of
Canadian corporations beyond certain threshold limits. This agency,
still active today under the Investment Canada Act, recently used its
power to block foreign acquisition for the first time, prohibiting the
American takeover of a Canadian space-focused research and
development company.7
This historical context indicates that Canada’s approach to FDI
has been strategic and selective. The federal government approached
FDI from a cautious perspective, cognizant of the dangers that a high
concentration of foreign ownership could impose. Government
procurement, however, is best regarded as a special subset of general
FDI. Procurement does not generally entail continued foreign
ownership, but rather comprises the contractual agreements for the
government’s acquisition of goods or provision of services. Granted,
the recent boom in public-private partnerships (“P3s”) is a
procurement phenomenon, but since a discussion of P3s would
overwhelm this paper, I focus generally on procurement that fits the
above description.8
As I will show, federal policy towards
government procurement has remained strategic and selective, albeit
tempered by Canada’s acceptance of increasingly restrictive free-trade
agreements like NAFTA.
First, the policies of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
(“TBCS”), responsible for implementing Cabinet-approved programs
and securing the resources necessary to implement executive decisions
are indicative of how Canada manages its procurement needs. The
TBCS, acting pursuant to the Financial Administration Act, has the
authority to determine contracting policy within Canada and, as such,
has influential control over the scope and management of federal
procurement.9 The TBCS’s Contracting Policy, in particular, lays out
specific policy guidelines for all government purchasing and
contracting. The Board’s stated objective is to “acquire goods and
services and to carry out construction in a manner that enhances

See Denis Gascon, Canada Uses Investment Canada Act to Block Acquisition of
MDA by Alliant Techsystems, (2008) Competition/Antitrust Information (Ogilvy

7

Renault LLP), online: <http://www.ogilvyrenault.com/files/510-e.PDF>.
For an overview of recent P3 developments within Canada, see Mario Iacobacci,
“Dispelling the Myths: A Pan-Canadian Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships for
Infrastructure Investments”, Conference Board of Canada (2010).
9 Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 s.7.
8
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access, competition and fairness and results in best value or, if
appropriate, the optimal balance of overall benefits to the Crown and
the Canadian people.”10 The policy’s mention of “fairness” and
“competition” is, in part, a response to the sponsorship scandal that
implicated the Canadian Liberal government in 2004.11 However, the
final part of the stated objective contemplates an assessment of overall
Canadian benefit upon consideration of decisions. This type of
assessment tracks, to an extent, the wording of the Investment Canada
Act. This act makes decisions about foreign ownership based on an
assessment of “net benefit” to Canada. It appears that there is a
connection between policy-based evaluations of FDI in general and
procurement decisions specifically.12
Further support for the position that the Canadian
government manages federal procurement strategically is found in the
Contracting Policy Notice of 2007 (published by the TBCS). This
Notice states that the Contracting Policy objective is purposefully
broad in order to “[permit the] government to use procurement to
complement other government priorities”.13
These “other
government priorities” include “long-term industrial and regional
development and other appropriate national objectives, including
aboriginal economic development.”14
Aboriginal economic development is an area of special
concern to Canadian federal officials, and is an interesting example of
how the Canadian government has managed tensions between
international obligations and domestic policy. The Procurement
Strategy for Aboriginal Businesses (“PSAB”) is an initiative
undertaken by the federal government in an effort to foster aboriginal
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Contracting Policy, online:<http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=14494> at para 1[Contracting Policy].
11 For a detailed discussion of the scandal, see the summary of the report “Who is
Responsible”, drafted after the extensive hearings of the Gomery Commission. The
report is available from Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and
Government Services of Canada, online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pcobcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-0306/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/summary/es_full_v01.pdf>.
12 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., 1985, (1st Supp.) c. 28, s.16(1).
13 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Contracting Policy Notice 2007-04 - NonCompetitive Contracting, online: <http://www.tbssct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/dcgpubs/contpolnotices/2007/0920-eng.asp> [Policy Notice Sept
2007].
14 Contracting Policy, supra note 17, at para 2.
10
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development and support socio-economic growth in First Nations
communities. It accomplishes its mandate by restricting bidding on
government contracts for goods and services which “primarily benefit
Aboriginal people” with a value of over $5000 to Aboriginal
businesses through a set-aside process.15 The PSAB is able to restrict
federal procurement contracts in this manner because it operates
under an exclusion clause in NAFTA that allows set-asides for small
and minority businesses.16
This small example illustrates how the Canadian federal
government, while committing itself to a high level of foreign
competition through the agreements discussed in the first section of
this paper, attempts to maintain a level of discretion and control over
its procurement decisions. Exceptions (such as the PSAB) are
critically important for Canada to maintain control over the way its
procurement decisions affect uniquely Canadian domestic issues. But
what about uniquely Canadian issues which are not exempt from the
provisions of NAFTA and the GPA? Concerns over troubled
Canadian industries beg a strategic approach beyond small NAFTA
exemptions and, until recently, the absence of sub-federal
procurement within international obligations has given Canada a
mechanism by which to maintain strategic control. It is possible to
view the government as being in a contest with its own international
obligations. Federal goals such as “support[ing] Canadian industries in
difficulty…and protect[ing] the families and communities who
depend on those jobs” may be frustrated by agreements which
mandate foreign competition. 17 The government’s own Policy Notice
admits that “Canada’s Trade Agreements remove some flexibility on
how government may use the procurement system for other needs.”18
Examined against this background, the incentive of the federal
government to push for provincial procurement commitments
(outside of negotiations mandated by NAFTA and the GPA19) seems

Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada, Procurement
Strategy for Aboriginal Business, Performance Report 2004 (Ottawa: Minister of
Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006) [PSAB].
16NAFTA, supra note 8 at Annex 1001.2b(d).
17 Canada, Governor General, Speech from the Throne, 40th Parl. 2nd sess., (26
15

January 2009).
18
19

Policy Notice Sept 2007, supra note 20.
GPA, supra note 9 at Article XXIV:7(b); NAFTA, supra note 8 at Article 1024.
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limited, and may explain why sub-federal obligations were absent for
so long.
Finally, federal pressure on sub-federal procurement may
have been limited because of negotiation tactics during WTO
meetings on the GPA. In a response to questions about sub-federal
procurement from a WTO committee, Canadian delegates responded
that:
Canada is prepared to table an offer at the sub-central level if,
and only if, members are prepared: (1) to include sectors of
priority to Canadian suppliers, for example, in the steel and
transportation areas; and (2) to agree to circumscribe the use
of small business and other set asides in a manner that, while
not precluding their use, would provide an acceptable
security of access to suppliers from all members of this
committee.20

Collins argues that, during these negotiations, Canada was basically
using provincial procurement as a bargaining chip to try to extract
beneficial treatment for Canadian industries with other WTO
member states (a strategy that was unsuccessful in the WTO
negotiations).21
The Agreement, then, can be viewed as a
continuation of this strategy: an exchange of Canadian provincial
procurement for reciprocal access in the American market. But is the
Agreement as beneficial for Canada as WTO concessions would have
been, had the Canadian delegation been successful in negotiating
them in the 1990s? I will return to this question in the latter half of
this paper. Before doing so, I examine provincial motivation for
retaining control over their respective procurement decisions.
iii) Provincial Concerns & Hesitations
Provincial motivations, combined with the division of powers
in Canadian federalism, may have played a role in keeping sub-federal
procurement obligations out of the GPA and NAFTA. While the
federal government under international law has the sole right to
EC, Review of National Implementing Legislation – Canada, World Trade
Organization Doc. GPA/51 (18
June 2001).
21 Collins, supra note 11 at 16.
20
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negotiate treaties, Canadian domestic law requires international
agreements that expend public funds or change domestic law to be
ratified in Canada before they have force or effect.22 Yet, as per the
Constitution Act 1867, the federal government has no power to ratify
legislation for issues over which the provinces have jurisdiction. These
issues include matters such as “local works and undertakings”, which
Section 92 deems to be under provincial authority.23 Thus, any
attempt to mandate provincial acceptance of international
procurement obligations is subject to provincial approval. Note that
this differs from the procedure in the United States, where the federal
government has the power to compel state performance with federally
implemented international treaty obligations.24 In the US, any failure
to compel state compliance is generally due to political relations
between federal and state governments, rather than constitutional
issues.25
So have the provinces been eager to give their approval of
international procurement obligations? It is my position that, much
like the federal government, the provinces have historically seen
more to be gained from maintaining autonomous control and
flexibility in their procurement policy rather than increased trade
restrictions. There are a number of reasons for this.
The primary reason for a provincial protectionist attitude is
financial gain. Cooper discusses this position from the American
perspective, noting that if states lose their ability to discriminate in
favour of local businesses, overall national gains may be realized, but
at the expense of state prosperity.26 The same can be said in the
Canadian context. A procurement contract for rail infrastructure in
Manitoba, for example, might have the effect of increasing
productivity in neighbouring Ontario; however, if the lowest bidder is
an Ohio corporation, then the Manitoba construction industry may
lose out. In Canada, the provinces are already somewhat committed
to their provincial neighbours by the Agreement on Internal Trade

22
23

Francis v. The Queen, [1956] SCR 618 at 625.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,

No. 5. s. 92.
24 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
25 K Cooper, “To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance With International Trade
Agreements at the State Level” (1993) 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 143 at 144 [Cooper].
26 Ibid, at 166.
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(“AIT”). This agreement, signed by First Ministers in 1994, prevents
provincial trade barriers in key areas, and works to reduce existing
For the provinces, already limited in their
trade barriers.27
procurement decisions by the AIT, further liberalization at the hands
of international obligations may be regarded as severely limiting and,
potentially, economically harmful. In addition, provincial premiers
will undoubtedly consider the political ramifications of procurement
liberalization. Since the premiers have already lost the ability to
discriminate between local and Canadian businesses, losing that
power with respect to foreign businesses could cost them significant
voter support. Where provinces do not have domestic industry of a
size that can compete in the international market, it will be difficult
to realize a net benefit.
Another possible reason the provinces did not take proactive
steps to include themselves in the GPA is the difficulty that comes
with reviewing disputes over public procurement or negotiating a
position in the first place. Just as implementation and negotiation
costs caused Australia and New Zealand to shy away from the GPA, so
these costs could have served as a barrier for provincial entities.28
Especially for the smaller Eastern provinces with fewer government
support staff, the looming spectre of compliance with broad
international obligations can be daunting.
Finally, provincial hesitation may have been due, in part, to
regionalism and reluctance to bargain with the federal government.
Canadian federal-provincial relations are rife with regional tensions,
and in recent decades, phenomenons like ‘western alienation’ have
complicated matters of provincial-federal comity.29 Further, public
perception of procurement markets may lean more towards
protectionism than liberalization. Indeed, unlike international tariffs,
procurement spending could be viewed more as an internal issue
where government patronage should play a stronger role.30

Agreement on Internal Trade Implementation Act, S.C. 1996, c.17.
M Dischendorfer, “The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on
Government Procurement Under the Framework of the WTO” (2000) 9 Public
Procurement Law Review 1 at 28.
29 Collins, supra note 11 at 20.
30 Christopher McCrudden, “International economic law and the pursuit of human
rights: A framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective purchasing' laws under
the WTO Government procurement agreement” (1999) 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 3 at 11-12.
27
28
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There are reasons, however, for provincial acceptance of
binding procurement obligations. “Market access” is foremost among
these. With a large resource pool and relatively small population,
Canada has always depended on market access for its exports in order
to remain competitive in its industry and service sectors. This is
especially true in the context of Canada’s relation to the United States
(Canada’s largest trading partner in both imports and exports). It is
well within the power of the provinces to cripple their domestic
industry by engaging in overly protectionist policies with respect to
government spending, if beneficial reciprocal deals are available with
trading partners. Failure to accept reciprocal procurement agreements,
however, is not necessarily protectionist on its face, but could simply
mean that the available agreements are not beneficial. Any deal
entered, therefore, must stand up to scrutiny on an economic
perspective as well as a political one.
There is also an argument to be made that market efficiency is
best served by placing domestic firms in more direct competition with
foreign counterparts.
By favouring domestic business through
sheltered procurement processes, provincial governments are tacitly
providing a form of subsidy which discourages technological
innovation and efficiency gains. Again, this argument must be
reconciled with the need to shelter and protect fledgling domestic
industries that may struggle in the face of larger foreign counterparts
wielding economies of scale.
Collins argues that opening up provincial procurement would
also allow foreign firms with Canadian outward FDI to do more
business with Canadian provinces, which would in turn further
benefit Canadian FDI investors.31 This argument presupposes that
Canadian provinces do not or cannot currently favour firms with
Canadian FDI, which is not necessarily the case. It is well within the
current ability of the provinces to accept procurement bids from
foreign competitors. Assuming that the provinces could politically
and economically justify the decision to accept a foreign bid (based on
Canadian FDI investment or ownership), nothing stands in their way.
There is no reason to assume that provincial inclusion in the GPA
would foster greater provincial support for Canadian FDI in foreign
corporations.

31

Collins, supra note 11 at 20.
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Canadian provinces may also want to agree to open their
procurement purchasing to foreign competition in a gesture of goodfaith to the international community. The international trend seems
to be moving towards increased sub-federal procurement comity, as
evidenced by China’s recent commitment of sub-central government
entities in its WTO membership negotiations.32 Like the Chinese,
Canada could at least commit partial sub-federal coverage, and
continue to make concessions as the commitments of other nations
increase, rather than completely excluding sub-federal procurement.
But this strategy may be too naïve for Canada. China’s inclusion of
sub-central entities in the WTO was mainly an attempt to access the
American procurement markets which have been made available.
Canada should ensure that it acts cautiously and with appropriate
strategy towards these two global entities, rather than quickly
following suit because of an apparent emerging trend.
Evaluating the various reasons for and against procurement
liberalization, it is not difficult to see why the provinces have been
reluctant to commit themselves internationally. While it may be true,
as Collins argues, that GPA commitments from the provinces could
have economic advantages, Canada and its provinces need to carefully
regulate their commitments as they have done in the past with FDI.
Just as Chang and Green found that developed western nations
benefited from strategic control of FDI in the past, and that a failure
to be strategic now could cripple developing nations,33 so should
Canada continue to be selective in its procurement commitments.
iv) The Business Perspective, the ARRA, and the Buy American Hype
To this point, I have shown the federal and provincial
governments’ propensity for selective engagement with FDI—
including foreign bids on government procurement—and advocated
for a continuation of that policy. I now turn to examine the
T Xinchao, “Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal Framework and a Transition
to the WTO GPA” (2003) 17 Temple Int’l & Comp. L.J. 139 at 167.
33 Ha Joon Chang and Duncan Green, “The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment:
Do as we Say, Not as we Did” (2003) Research report for the South Centre,
Intergovernmental Policy Think Tank of Developing Countries, online:
<http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&
gid=238&Itemid=&lang=en> [Chang].
32
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controversy over the Buy American provisions of the ARRA. My aim
is to distil the effects that these provisions might have had if the
Agreement had not been. I look first to the scope of American and
Canadian procurement markets.
It is difficult to estimate just how much money Canadian
businesses stand to make or lose based on liberalization of government
procurement. Prior to entering the Agreement, DFAIT commissioned
two surveys of businesses that sold goods or services to foreign
governments in an attempt to elicit concrete figures on business
support for reciprocal government procurement access. The results of
these surveys provide useful insight into DFAIT’s motivation to
conclude the Agreement, and also information on how much business
is at stake in the government procurement arena. The first survey,
concluded in 2001, found, not surprisingly, that the US was the most
important procurement market for Canadian businesses. It also found
that 65% of Canadian businesses surveyed “would be willing to give
up preferred access to Canadian provincial and local government
markets on an equal basis with U.S. firms”.34 The survey did not,
however, indicate that a reciprocal trade agreement would necessarily
be the best solution to difficulties in securing government
procurement business.
In fact, the top selected barriers to
government procurement contracts include “lack of timely
information on opportunities” and “failure to have opportunities
announced.”35
A second DFAIT survey, conducted in 2008, focused on
government procurement in eight foreign markets other than the US:
Brazil, Russia, India, China, UK, France, Germany and Japan. This
survey found that 89% of businesses who were not already selling to
foreign governments had at least some interest in doing so, and that
72% of businesses surveyed were “not opposed” to opening all levels
of Canadian procurement to foreign companies in exchange for
reciprocal access.36 These surveys indicate that there was interest in

PriceWaterHouseCoopers, “Study of Market Priorities for Canadian Businesses
Selling to Foreign Governments: Final Report” Prepared for the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (18 April, 2001) at ii.
35 Ibid.
36 Phoenix Strategic Perspectives Inc., “Final Report: Business Survey on Government
Procurement Market Access Priorities” Prepared for the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Canada (January 2008) at ii and 8.
34
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foreign procurement markets, but, especially concerning the US, the
businesses do not indicate the extent to which a reciprocal agreement
would solve their problems. The surveys are far from conclusive
evidence that business opinion favoured procurement market
liberalization prior to the controversy over the ARRA.
The ARRA controversy, when it came, was sudden and
forceful. The ARRA, regarded as a critical tool in the attempt to slow
the American recession, was welcomed in the US, but its reception in
Canada was not so hospitable. When the bill was first introduced,
some industry leaders pegged the ARRA as catastrophic and
demanded Canadian political intervention.37
Michael Wilson,
Canadian ambassador to the United States, wrote that the bill could
“create a global economic calamity akin to the Great Depression.”38
The uproar quickly spread to provincial politicians. By June 9, 2009,
the premiers were meeting to denounce the provisions of the ARRA,
arguing that measures needed to be taken immediately:
Premiers believe the time has come for all orders of
Government in Canada and the U.S. to engage in a renewed
era of collaboration to ensure open markets between the
two countries. Therefore, they support open and inclusive
discussion of all means, including the negotiation of a
broad, reciprocal procurement liberalization agreement,
covering federal, provincial/territorial and state government
measures, in order to secure mutually-beneficial market
access and to exclude Canada from the negative effects of
measures such as Buy American provisions39

Clearly this was a strong reaction, but just how disastrous were the
implications of the ARRA?
The primary objection to the ARRA was Section 1605, which
states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available by this Act may be used for a project for the construction,
alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work
unless all of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the
See the comments of Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters spokesperson JeanMichel Laurin, MacCharles, supra note 2.
38 Sheldon Alberts, “U.S. protectionism could set off ‘downward spiral,’ Canada
warns”, The National Post (2 February 2009) online:
<http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=1244646>.
39 Council June 09, supra note 3.
37
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project are produced in the United States” (emphasis added).40 This
provision made funding contingent on purchasing American valueadded goods, with the following exceptions: if doing so would be
contrary to the public interest; if the needed goods weren’t available
in the needed quantity; or if costs would increase by more than 25%
on the project in question. In response to criticism outside of the US,
the US Senate also added a clause to Section 1605 which states that
the section should be applied in a manner consistent with US
obligations under international agreements.41 Yet this last provision
would have had little effect. It may have served to alleviate public
tension, but as the US does not have sub-federal obligations to Canada
under international agreements, the ramifications of this clause are
negligible. Under NAFTA there are no covered sub-federal entities,
and under the GPA the US’ Annex 2 specifically exempted Canada
(before the conclusion of the Agreement).42
The other provision that attracted widespread criticism was
Section 604, which applied American production requirements to a
broad range of goods purchased by the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”). This provision was of less concern, given that the
DHS is covered by federal procurement obligations to Canada under
NAFTA; however, certain agencies within the DHS, like the US Coast
Guard, are not explicitly mentioned in NAFTA, other than within
national security exemptions.43 This left agencies like the Coast Guard
with a confusing array of obligations to meet, and could have resulted
in Canadian suppliers losing contracts as a result of actual or perceived
effects of the Section 604. Perceived effects also may have affected
Canadian suppliers under Section 1605. According to an update
released by Canadian law firm Bennett Jones LLP, there was evidence
to suggest that US distributors, eager to stay on the right side of the
new law and maintain their contingent funding, chose not to stock

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 1605(a) (2009).
“US Senate eases ‘trade war’ bill” BBC News (5 February 2009), online: BBC News
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7871219.stm>.
42 As part of the Agreement, the US removed the Canadian exemption from its Annex
2 text. For more detail see the WTO Commitments section of this paper below,
explaining how US and Canadian obligations have permanently changed as a result of
the Agreement.
43 NAFTA, supra note 8, at Annex 1001.1a-1 (US list of Federal Entities).
40
41
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Canadian goods in order to avoid confusion when supplying state or
municipally funded projects.44
The Canadian discomfort towards the ARRA appears even
more justified when considered in light of the NAFTA-based dispute
ADF Group Inc v. USA. At issue in ADF was Section 102.05 of a
construction contract between a US purchaser and Canadian supplier,
which stated that “all iron and steel products (including miscellaneous
steel items such as fasteners, nuts, bolts and washers) incorporated for
use on this project shall be produced in the United States of America;
unless the use of any such items will increase the cost of the overall
project by more than 25%” (emphasis added).45 The tribunal also
defined the production process at issue in much the same way as the
ARRA, including in ‘production’ any process of altering or
transforming raw material into an item or product which differs from
the original. The tribunal in ADF ultimately found that the investor’s
NAFTA claim was not made out because they had not adequately
shown that the cost of the project would increase or that alternate
products were not available (a troubling precedent for Canadians
hoping to make use of the Section 1605 exceptions).
So, with restrictive legislative provisions and exceptions
interpreted in a discomforting fashion, were Canadians right to fear
the ARRA? A further look at the economic context suggests that
perhaps they were not.
One particular Canadian concern was the $61 billion dollars
earmarked for transportation projects within the ARRA. As the third
largest category of allocated funds, next to the Medicaid and HealthLabor-Education categories, transportation funding rightly attracted
the attention of competitive Canadian steel and iron manufacturers.46
This concern, however, was misplaced. It failed to consider the
provisions of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (“STAA”), on
the books since 1982, which incorporates restrictive Buy-American
provisions originally found in the Buy American Act of 1933. In fact,
the text Section 1605 of the ARRA mirrors almost exactly the
provisions of the STAA, which also mandates a preference for US
Barutciski, supra note 3.
AGF Group Inc. v. USA (2003) 18 ICSID Rev. 195 at para 58.
46 Karin Yourish, “A Breakdown of the Final Bill” The Washington Post, online:
44
45

<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgovvendreaugouvusa/assets/pdfs/sell2usgov/breakdown_final_bill_021409.pdf>.
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steel, iron, or goods for use in federally funded mass-transit projects.47
As a result, Canadian investment in this sector of US procurement is
already low, and, even if amended or rescinded, Section 1605 of the
ARRA isn’t likely to change that.
Outside of the transportation sector, the effect of Section 1605
may not have been large in scope either. Prior to the ARRA, US subfederal governments and agencies were already free to impose
restrictions on Canadian businesses; indeed, many were already in the
practice of doing so. According to DFAIT, US procurement agencies
regularly required more favourable pricing by up to 15% from
Canadian suppliers.48 As a result, Canadian companies doing business
at the sub-federal level were well accustomed to restrictive pricing
tactics and used competitive tactics to work around such practices.
Since the ARRA would only mandate another 10% price reduction
from American suppliers before a Canadian supplier could be
considered, the effects may not have been as severe as perceived.
Finally, the application of the Section 1605 exceptions may
not have been as restrictive as contemplated by the ADF precedent.
The exception for “unavailable articles” is currently recognized by the
US government to apply to a large list of items, including common
metals and materials like nickel and rubber.49 Small exceptions even
exist for highly contested Canadian steel products in certain
infrastructure products. The Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), for example, has granted a nationwide de minimus
exemption to Canadian steel so long as it comprises less than 5% of
the total project.50 The EPA also secured a ‘public interest’ exemption
from Section 1605 for Clean Drinking Water projects which were

Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5323j.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Buy American Primer,
online: <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgovvendreaugouvusa/assets/pdfs/sell2usgov/BAAPrimer_eng.pdf>.
49 See the current updated list of unavailable articles online:
<https://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2025_1.html#wp1118883>.
50 Micheal H. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water: Environmental
Protection Agency, “Notice of nationwide waiver of Section 1605 (Buy American
Requriement) of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) for de
minimis incidental components of projects financed through the Clean or Drinking
Water State Revolving Funds using assistance provided under ARRA” (22 May 2009).
47
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negotiated in the 4 months before the enactment of the ARRA.51
While these exceptions are far from all-encompassing, they point to
the reasonableness of US agencies in their procurement dealings, and
indicate that, were such concessions not obviated by the Agreement,
more concessions may have been forthcoming in the future.
Nevertheless, the objections to the ARRA continued to come
from many sectors in Canada, placing increasing pressure on Canadian
politicians to respond.
III
ANALYZING THE AGREEMENT
On February 5, 2010, Canadian Minister of International
Trade Peter Van Loan announced that the Canadian and American
governments had concluded an agreement that promised Canadian
companies the concessions they had been seeking: exemption from
Section 1605 of the ARRA. Beyond this exemption, the deal also gave
Canadian companies access to the sub-federal American entities in the
US GPA Annex and fast-tracked similar future negotiations, “should
similar Buy American provisions be applied to future funding
programs"—a situation which sounds much more like a ‘when’ than
an ‘if’.52 Whether or not this agreement provides a net benefit to
Canada, and is justified given the context in which it was created, is
the subject of the remainder of this paper.

Micheal H. Shapiro, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water: Environmental
Protection Agency, “Notice of nationwide waiver of Section 1605 (Buy American
Requriement) of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) for
projects that solicited bids on or after October 1, 2008 and prior to February 17, 2009
that are financed through the Clean or Drinking Water State Revolving Funds using
assistance provided under ARRA” (22 May 2009).
52 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release, 56 “Canada
and United States reach agreement on Buy American” (5 February 2010), online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/media_commerce/comm/newscommuniques/2010/056.aspx>.
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i) WTO GPA Commitments
At the outset, it is important to mention that the GPA has
been undergoing a series of revisions intended to: make it easier to
navigate; account for electronic bidding and procurement tools; and
update the review procedures for arbitration processes.53 As a result,
the Agreement between Canada and the US was reached pursuant to
the “Revised Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement
(Articles I-XXI) as at 13 November 2007 (WTO Document negs 268
(19 November 2007)).”54 This revised GPA text is, unfortunately, not
available to the public at this time. As a result, I evaluate the
Agreement’s changes by reference to the “Revision of the Agreement
on Government Procurement as at 8 December 2006”, the most recent
provisionally agreed upon text of the GPA.55 Currently there are
mixed reviews of the Revised GPA. Arie Reich, in a detailed
comparison of the new text, found it to be a slight improvement over
the 1994 GPA, but with serious flaws in the new review and
arbitration procedures.
Other scholars have given it a more
favourable review.56 Suffice to say, for the purposes of this paper, that
both Canada and the US are working within the confines of the
Revised GPA, or at least a slightly modified version of the Revised
GPA.
i. (a) American Commitments
Article IV of the Agreement outlines the changes made by the
American government to its commitments under the GPA. Prior to

World Trade Organization, “The re-negotiation of the Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA)” online:
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/negotiations_e.htm>.
54 Agreement, at Article II.
55 Revision of the Agreement on Government Procurement as at 8 December 2006,
WTO Document GPA/W/297, (11 December 2006). The full text of the RGPA is
available from the WTO website, online: <
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/PLURI/GPA/W297.d
oc>.
56 Arie Reich, “The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An
Analysis and Assessment” (2009) J. Int’l Econ. L. 989 at pg 1021.
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the conclusion of the Agreement, Note 5 of the General Notes to the
US Annexes read:
For goods and services (including construction) of the
following countries and suppliers of such goods and services,
this Agreement does not apply to procurement by the entities
listed in Annexes 2 and 3 or the waiver described in Annex 3:
Canada
The United States is prepared to amend this note at such time
as coverage with respect to these annexes can be resolved
with a Party listed above.57

Article IV of the Agreement requires the US to “delete the reference
to Canada with respect to Annex 2”, thus allowing Canada access to all
of the sub-federal US entities who procure in accordance with the
GPA.58 While American sub-federal inclusion in the GPA was
initially meagre, as a result of federal prompting the US has included a
significant number of sub-federal entities in its Annex 2 since as early
as 2002. Currently, 37 states are at least partially represented.
Generally, the states who have accepted the GPA list their central
procurement agency (by its respective name) or the blanket
“executive branch agencies” within Annex 2, ensuring that the GPA
provisions will apply to most procurement decisions.
The 13 states that remain absent, however, mark a substantial
part of the American population. Ohio, Georgia, and North Carolina,
for example, three of the top ten most populated states in America, are
absent from Annex 2. Annex 2 also includes a number of notable
specific exceptions. Procurement of construction-grade steel, motor
vehicles, and coal is exempted from the following states: Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New York, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming. In addition,
procurement for all of the 37 listed states is exempted from the GPA if
the procurement is by way of federally originating funds intended for
mass transit or highway projects.59

GPA, supra note 9 at USA Annex General Notes, Note 5.
Agreement, supra note 4 at Article IV.
59 GPA, supra note 9 at USA Annex 2.
57
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The US Annex 2 threshold for services and supplies are also
among the highest of the WTO parties to the GPA. Much like under
NAFTA, the provisions of the GPA apply only to selected entities, and
only if the total cost of the procurement in question exceeds a certain
threshold. The GPA uses generic threshold figures called Special
Drawing Rights (“SDR”) throughout its provision, allowing for revised
dollar figures to be submitted by the parties annually instead of
requiring a full revised text each year. Currently, one SDR is equal to
roughly 1.7 Canadian Dollars, and thus an SDR of 355,000 would
equal approximately $604,500 Canadian.60 The American Annex 2
threshold is 355,000SDR for supplies and services, and 5 million SDR
for construction projects. While the construction threshold is
standard, the supplies and services threshold is higher than most GPA
signatories by 155,000SDR.61
i. (b) Canadian Commitments
Because it did not previously have any entities listed in its
Annex 2, Canada's commitment regarding the GPA is much longer
than that of the US. Article III of the Agreement commits Canada to
submitting a package of revised Annexes (Annexes 2, 4, 5, and
General Notes) which mirror Appendix A of the Agreement to the
WTO. Currently, these revised Annexes will benefit only the US, as a
result of a restrictive note inserted into Canada’s new General Notes,
although the notes make it clear that Canada is willing to negotiate
mutually acceptable agreements with the other WTO parties.62
The new Canadian Annex 2 covers all of the provinces and
territories (except Nunavut), and applies the provisions of the GPA to
almost all of the government departments within those provinces and
territories. Like the US, however, there are some exceptions. Alberta
and BC exempt the Legislative Assembly from Annex 2, which would
The thresholds in appendix I of the agreement as expressed in national currencies
for 2010-2011, WTO Doc GPA/W/309/Add.2 (21 December 2009).
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The relative thresholds of each GPA signatory are listed on the WTO website,
online: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/thresh_e.htm>.
62 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix A, General Note 6, which reads: “With the
exception of the United States of America, the offer by Canada with respect to goods
and services (including construction) in Annex 2 is subject to negotiation of mutually
acceptable commitments (including thresholds) with other Parties.”
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seemingly exempt any procurement ordered directly by provincial
legislation. Ontario exempts all “urban rail and transport equipment,
systems, components…as well as all project-related materials”.
Québec exempts any procurement of construction-grade steel. In
addition to these specifics, general exemptions are made for all of the
following: highway projects, school boards and academic institution
construction procurement (outside of Ontario and Québec), Crown
corporations, and procurement of goods purchased for
representational or promotional purposes (in a selection of provinces,
including Ontario).
Finally, in a vague exception, all “procurement that is
intended to contribute to economic development” in the Yukon or
Northwest Territories, or Atlantic Canada or Manitoba, is exempt.
Use of this exemption, however, would likely be limited to situations
where Canada has an established program in place to aid in the
development of a disadvantaged region, such as the Atlantic Canada
Opportunities Agency.63 Canada also adopts the US SDR thresholds:
355,000 for goods and services and 5 million for construction
services.64
i. (c) Evaluating the Reciprocal Commitments
Of all the Canadian commitments in the Agreement, Canada’s
commitments to the GPA are the least troubling. For one, Canada
was under an obligation, as per Article XXIV 7(b) of the GPA, to
undertake further negotiations to liberalize the scope of Canadian
entities which procured according to WTO guidelines.65 Canada had
shirked this responsibility for a long time. Making the commitments
now will undoubtedly elicit support from supporters of free trade as
well as other WTO GPA members. In fact, had Canada not made
Annex 2 GPA commitments in the Agreement, there is reason to
believe that they may have done so without US prompting.
The ACOA, established over 20 years ago, works to “create opportunities for
economic growth in Atlantic Canada by helping businesses become more competitive,
innovative and productive, by working with diverse communities to develop and
diversify local economies, and by championing the strengths of Atlantic Canada”. See
more information online at: <http://www.acoa.ca/English/Pages/Home.aspx>.
64 Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix A, Annex 2.
65 GPA, supra note 9 at Article XXIV:7(b).
63
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Notwithstanding pressure from the WTO and other states to include
Annex 2 entities, academics have also begun to take notice of Canada’s
Annex 2 exclusions and call for a response.66 Even for those who
generally oppose increased international trade, the fact that these
WTO commitments currently apply only to the US should offer some
reassurance. This is not a headlong plunge into uncharted waters.
Rather, by making commitments to the US and waiting to negotiate
with others, Canada is taking a more sequenced approach.
Nevertheless, Canada’s commitments must be weighed against
what it was able to achieve in return. It is true that the Canadian
exclusions are broad in scope, but some of them merely balance the
exclusions maintained by the United States. Exceptions for highway
projects and the restrictive SDR threshold, for example, clearly track
the American provisions. Québec’s steel exemption also appears to
save a valued provincial procurement market. When considered in
light of the much broader exemption of steel, coal, and motor vehicles
in 12 large populated US states, however, it pales in comparison. The
Canadian exemptions for Crown corporations, academic or
educational facility construction, and “economic development” in
selected areas are likely to be the most beneficial as measured by their
ability to retain provincial control over procurement. Even so, these
must be considered against the backdrop of partial American GPA
coverage. Canada has committed all of its provinces and territories
(aside from Nunavut) to the GPA, while the US has retained control
over procurement in a quarter of its state entities. It could be argued
that Canada’s “economic development” exemption is an attempt to
respond to the absence of 13 US states; but, in order to rely on that
exemption, Canada faces an onerous burden of proof. In contrast, the
13 exempted states can simply claim immunity from the provisions of
the GPA.
Criticism for the provincial acceptance of GPA responsibilities
can also be made on the basis that the provinces are losing valued
resource control that is needed for specific development goals. I
alluded earlier to the study by Chang and Green which advocates
against multilateral investment obligations for the third world, on the
basis that surrendering control over these decisions will be

66

Collins, supra note 11.
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detrimental to development goals.67 The same concerns are present in
debates over procurement obligations. WTO critics like Christopher
McCrudden have long expounded the dangerous local consequences
of accepting international obligations, and also the possible human
rights implications of treaties like the GPA.68 The GPA itself
recognizes these concerns, and gives special rights to developing
nations who might otherwise be adversely affected by overbearing
procurement commitments.69 In doing so it acknowledges the
potentially damaging effects of trade liberalization where strict
control is needed to foster economic development. Though Canada
has included the economic development provision, it does not apply
to the western provinces, Ontario, or Québec, and as we have seen in
recent years, economic downturns can threaten workers across the
country, even in otherwise prosperous locations. Thus, any loss of
discretion on procurement decisions could increase the strain on
troubled Canadian industry.
These lasting provincial GPA commitments are also troubling
due to the environment in which they were reached: an emotionally
and politically charged flurry of attention. The fact that the provinces
had been given the opportunity for 15 years to initiate negotiations
with the federal government on GPA commitment, but only chose to
do so once they came under pressure for doing nothing about the
ARRA, indicates that this agreement was entered hastily rather than
thoughtfully to provide the best long-term outcome for Canada. Why
were permanent sub-federal commitments even necessary if the main
concern was over restrictive ARRA provisions, which are addressed in
a separate agreement? Negotiated together, as they were, it seems
more likely that these less-than-ideal permanent Canadian
commitments were used as a bargaining chip in order to convince the
US to allow Canada the exemptions that it sought under the ARRA. If
Canada had been negotiating these permanent commitments
separately, surely the hype over the ARRA would have put less
Chang, supra note 40.
McCrudden has argued that the United States has used procurement purchasing
power through state legislation to influence the human rights policies of states such as
Myanmar (Burma). See Christopher McCrudden, “International economic law and
the pursuit of human rights: A framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective
purchasing' laws under the WTO Government procurement agreement” (1999) 2 J.
Int’l Econ. L. 48.
69 GPA, supra note 9 at Article V.
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pressure on the negotiators to reach a settlement, and the inequalities
of the reciprocal provisions here would have been more apparent.
This leads to another important basis for criticism of the
permanent commitments: reciprocity.
Reciprocity, though an
ambiguous term, generally encompasses the giving and receiving of
equivalent rights and obligations.70 The difficulty comes in evaluating
an 'equivalent value', especially in negotiations such as these over
government procurement. Canada and the US are not nations of
equal size or stature. With a population almost ten times that of
Canada, the US stands to have far more firms operating in any given
field. Thus when Canada opens a section of its market to the US, the
chances of US firms noticing and posting bids to opportunities in that
market is greater than the chance of Canadian firms doing the same
towards an equal sized US market opening. While it is true that in
any given sector Canada may have fewer opportunities on which to
bid, the likelihood of each Canadian opportunity receiving a US bid is
greater than each US opportunity receiving a Canadian bid. For this
reason one might generally expect Canada to open a comparably
smaller portion of its provincial procurement market, proportional to
the amount of business Canadian companies can roughly expect to bid
on in the US. Yet in this deal we see a greater scope of Canadian
coverage. The effect could be to leave the US market (while
admittedly ‘open’ to Canadian bids) relatively free from Canadian
business, while the Canadian market is receiving American bids for
every opportunity it advertises. Surely a better arrangement was
possible.
ii) ARRA Exemptions and Commitments
In addition to permanent GPA changes, both Canada and the
US have agreed on several specific, temporary measures to facilitate a
more open system of government procurement. These measures are
effective from February 17, 2010 until September 30, 2011. It is these
temporary measures, breaking new and open ground in the field of
procurement purchasing, which are the most contentious of the
Agreement.
Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations” (1986) 40 International
Organization 1 at 8.
70
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ii. (a) American Commitments
The first commitment from the US is not actually a temporary
commitment, but, due to the temporary nature of the ARRA, it tacitly
functions as one. In Article V of the Agreement, the US agrees to
“take the necessary administrative steps to ensure that section 1605(a)
of the [ARRA] shall not be applied to Canadian iron, steel, or
manufactured goods in procurement covered by Annex 2 of the 1994
GPA.”71 The key part of this article is the mention of “administrative
steps”. Since, with the new GPA commitments, a Canadian investor
who feels slighted by the ARRA now has the ability to file a dispute
under the GPA, this provision is designed to alleviate concerns that
businesses will have to follow through a lengthy dispute process. It
attempts to put the responsibility on the US government to ensure
that the new GPA commitments are honoured and that the ARRA
does not intrude, rather than leave the complaining to the Canadian
investor. However, this applies only to procurement covered by the
new Annex 2.
The real temporary measures committed to by the US come in
Article VII. The US chose to implement its GPA commitments by
modifying its Annex 3 with a list of programs for which it will not
apply Section 1605(a) of the ARRA. The exempted US programs are:
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U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities
Services, Water and Waste Disposal Programs
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Housing
Services, Community Facilities Program
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Block Grants
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency
and Renewable Energy, State Energy Program
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Community Planning and Development,
Community Development Block Grants Recovery
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Public and Indian Housing, Public Housing
Capital Fund

Agreement, supra note 4 at Article V.
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water
and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds, for projects
funded by reallocated ARRA Funds where the contracts
are signed after February 17, 2010.72

Since the only exemption applied to these programs is Section
1605(a) of the ARRA, only construction contracts will be affected by
these temporary measures, and construction contacts are still subject
to the Annex 3 threshold, currently valued at 5million SDR (or
8.5million Canadian dollars). Also, there are no exemptions from
Section 604 of the ARRA; as a result, procurement from certain
agencies within the DHS could still face restrictive Buy American
provisions.
ii. (b) Canadian Commitments
Canada chose to implement its temporary measures by
creating an entirely new agreement in Appendix C of the Agreement
(which functions almost as a mini-GPA). This strategy makes the
most practical sense, since Canada does not have a specific list of
programs to exempt, and would otherwise have had to draft an
agreement which selectively applied only specific parts of the GPA, in
order to constrain its agreement to construction services. This tactic
also allowed Canada to include some general exceptions to its
otherwise broad commitment that would not have been covered
under the GPA. One such exemption is for entities operating sporting
or convention facilities who are complying with commercial
contracts, thus allowing any Vancouver Olympic procurement to
continue as planned.73
Beyond some minor differences in exemptions, such as the
one mentioned above, Canada’s Appendix C basically tracks the
Articles of the GPA, although with slightly simplified bidding and
tendering rules. The domestic review requirements of Appendix C
are similar to the GPA, with some noticeable elements removed from
the administrative rules of a reviewing body, including the right for
all parties to be heard prior to a decision being made on a challenge by
72
73

Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix B, USA Annex 3, List C.
Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, para 2(a)(ii).
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an investor.74 This modification allows a simpler review procedure,
and less input from the aggrieved US investor, should Canada be the
subject of a dispute.
Canada’s commitment is realized at the end of Appendix C,
where the covered entities and municipalities are listed. As with the
US, these temporary measures apply only over an $8.5 million
(Canadian dollar) threshold, but the list of Canadian entities that is
covered is staggering. All major Canadian municipalities are covered,
including all cities in British Columbia, Calgary, Edmonton,
Winnipeg, Toronto, Halifax, Montréal, Hamilton, London, Québec
City, and Ottawa. A large number of Crown corporations are
covered, with notable exceptions generally made for energy
producing Crown corporations such as Ontario Power Generation and
Régie de l’énergie. Exceptions are also made for mass-transit and
highway projects in both Ontario and Québec (at Québec’s
discretion). Beyond these exclusions, though, Canada’s commitment
is broad.75
ii. (c) Evaluating the Reciprocal Commitments
The only reason for Canada to commit its municipalities and
other entities as listed in Annex 3 was to give Canadian businesses a
chance to share in the spoils of the money allocated by the ARRA.
Thus, the evaluation of Canada’s temporary commitments under the
Agreement faces tougher scrutiny.
Most of this evaluation turns on how much of the ARRA
funding Canadian contractors are able to bid on. Of the 787 billion
dollars the ARRA promised to allocate, 275 billion is earmarked for
contract, grant, and loan funding which would be open to Canadian
bids. The rest is dispersed through tax benefits and entitlement
funding such as increased social service payouts. The problem is that,
by the time the Agreement was reached, most of those 275 billion
dollars had already been spent. According to data compiled by the US
government in the reporting period from February 17, 2009 (when
the ARRA was passed) until December 31, 2009, 182 billion dollars of
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Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, para 21.
Agreement, supra note 4 at Appendix C, Part B.
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the available 275 billion had been awarded to successful bidders.76
This left just 93 billion for allocation in 2010, and even less by
February 17, 2010, when Canadian companies were released from the
restrictive provisions of the ARRA. This figure also does not take into
account that Canadian companies can only bid on programs funded
under one of the seven exempted programs under the US Annex 3,
which together only encompass a portion of the programs undertaken
by four US departments. Moreover, these four departments together
concluded only 15% of the contracts awarded pursuant to the
ARRA.77
Even without exact figures, the deal seems one sided. Canada,
albeit with a smaller population and economy, has sacrificed its ability
to support Canadian businesses at almost every level of government—
federal, provincial, municipal, and through Crown corporations—in
exchange for an opportunity at the funding behind seven US
procurement programs.
As was discovered in the DFAIT
commissioned surveys, not all of our construction entities deal with
the US government, and many have no plans to do so. Even if they
did, much of the funding has already been spent, and sub-contracts
have already been designed with the ARRA provisions in mind. In an
editorial for the Toronto Star, columnist Scott Sinclair estimated that
Canadian companies would be able to bid for no more than 4 to 5
billion dollars of the total 275 billion, a dramatically smaller
estimation than the hype around the ARRA seems to have
contemplated. He also estimated the value of the Canadian municipal
procurement market envisioned by Appendix C at 25 billion dollars.78
Sinclair’s perspective on the deal has been criticized by free-trade
supporters, but his figures have not.79

Recovery.gov, online: <http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/home.aspx>.
Based on calculations from data as of February 13, 2010 pulled from the Federal
Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov), which provides award records for US
procurement contracts online:
<ftp://ftp.fbo.gov/FBORecoveryAwards/FBORecoveryAwards20100213.csv>.
78 Scott Sinclair, “Canada gives away the store in return for scraps from the US” The
Toronto Star (19 February 2010), online:
<http://www.thestar.com/opinion/article/767780--canada-gives-away-the-store-inreturn-for-scraps-from-u-s>.
79 Stephen Gordon, “Bad news is when you have to release the hostages too cheaply”,
National Post 922 February 2010), online:
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Even assuming that the numbers are equal, and that Canada
would have temporary access to the same amount of procurement
business that the US will have access to in Canada, the deal is subject
to criticism. For one, this Agreement contradicts the traditional
Canadian approach to FDI, as explained previously, at a time when
support for domestic industry is critical. The effects of the 2008
economic slowdown are unfolding in the Canadian economy, and the
Canadian stimulus spending (which has helped ease the effects of the
recession so far) is drying up. Measures taken under Canada’s
Economic Action Plan, affecting spending at all three levels of
government, are expected to cease funding projects by March 31,
2010.80 With Canadian stimulus funding nearing its end, it will be
even more important over the next year for Canadian construction
services to be able to secure contracts for government procurement
that are not the product of stimulus spending. This will be
increasingly difficult until the expiration of the Agreement. This
outcome is akin to the dangers warned of in the Gray Report, where it
was cautioned that entry by foreign industry could prevent Canadian
companies from developing.81 The danger is that American businesses
could cause the stagnation of Canadian companies that have already
developed, by dominating the increasingly small government
procurement market.
These temporary commitments are also subject to criticism
based on the context in which they were concluded. While Canada
may not have had 15 years to begin negotiations regarding the ARRA,
it certainly seems as though Canadian politicians reacted to public
outcry, rather than attempting to undertake a planned and measured
response on the enactment of the ARRA. The August 20, 2009, letter
from Canadian Trade Minister Stockwell Day to US Trade
Representative Ronald Kirk, making an initial proposal and seeking
Canadian exemption, is indicative of this hasty response. For one, the
letter came six months after the enactment of the ARRA, instead of
prior to or close to February 18, 2009. Also, the tone of the letter
indicates the ‘on bended knee’ approach that Minister Day adopted,
<http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2010/02/22/stephengordon-bad-news-is-when-you-have-to-release-the-hostages-too-cheaply.aspx>.
80 Canada, Governor General, Speech from the Throne, 40th Parl. 3rd sess., (3 March
2010).
81 Gray, supra note 13 at 43.
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referring several times to the “ambitious package of sub-federal
procurement” which Canada is offering to the US.82
Details of the negotiations are not readily available to the
public, so the preliminary offer made on August 20th is one of the few
sources of information we have about how the negotiations were
concluded. From an examination of this offer, it seems as though
Canada’s negotiating team was not totally without success. In this
initial letter, Canada offered to concede municipal and Crown
corporation procurement, of not just construction but all goods, and a
limited segment of additional services.83 The narrowing of Canada’s
offer is positive, but this must be matched against the US reservations.
Initially, Day asked for exemption from all the Buy American
requirements in the ARRA and exemption from similar requirements
in any future US legislation.84 What he eventually received was
exemption from 7 ARRA programs and an expedited negotiation
forum (in which Canada will no doubt be asked to make further
procurement concessions) should future Buy American provisions be
enacted.
Clearly the disparity between the commitments is
substantial and in favour of US interests.
Finally, it should be repeated that the exact impact of the
ARRA has always been in question. It may well have been within the
capacity of Canadian companies already operating in the US
procurement sector to work within the confines of a 25% price
increase limitation, since most of them were used to functioning in a
market where their prices needed to be highly favourable to be
competitive. Thus the ARRA might have had a negligible effect on
them. As for other companies considering entering this market, I am
sceptical that the details and nuances of the Agreement would be
made known to them in time for them to submit bids for the few
projects left with ARRA funding. Even if they were able to place bids
on ARRA funded projects, restrictive Buy American provisions in
place under other US legislation, including the STTA, are still in place
and will continue to have detrimental effects for Canadian businesses.
Canadian negotiators failed to win exclusion from STTA Buy
Letter from Honourable Stockwell Day to Honorable Ronald Kirk (20 August 2009)
[unpublished] [Day].
83 Ibid at “Canadian Proposal”, enclosure to Letter from Honourable Stockwell Day to
Honorable Ronald Kirk.
84 Day, supra note 89.
82

33

American provisions, and do not even seem to have contemplated
doing so, even while creating a ‘mechanism’ to quickly resolve
objection to any future Buy American legislation. It appears, rather,
that Canada, eager to get any agreement at all, hastily agreed to a
lopsided deal to resolve an issue which, in any event, may have had
only negligible effects.
IV
CONCLUSIONS
The dramatic expansion in global trade and international investment
in recent decades has placed issues of trade protectionism in the
center of public attention. This paper has left aside a detailed
discussion of these large, fiercely debated, issues and instead focused
on government procurement as a special subset of international trade
and FDI. I have shown reason why Canada has strived, not to be
protectionist, but to carefully approach its decisions with respect to
government procurement, specifically because it is an important way
in which to promote growth and development in the domestic
economy. While some might argue that the government should strive
for lower prices at all costs, I have shown that the Canadian federal
and provincial governments have historically taken a more nuanced
approach, and I have advocated that this approach continue.
Unfortunately, in response to the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, this nuanced approach became more of a blind
reaction to public demands for action. The Canadian government
hastily negotiated and concluded an agreement which has left little of
its sub-federal government procurement discretion available. This
response has overlooked many of the factors that indicate that the
ARRA would not have had as serious an impact on Canadian
businesses as the media attention seemed to indicate, and committed
Canada to permanent and temporary agreements (which may put
large sectors of Canadian industry at risk from American competitors).
As one National Post writer adroitly observed, “The recent resolution
of Canada's dispute over Buy American provisions in the U.S. stimulus
package contributed to the positive tone of the premiers meeting with
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governors at a downtown Washington hotel.”85 It is not surprising
that the governors were in such good spirits while hosting their
Canadian counterparts, having just bested them in such crucial
negotiations. No doubt the American celebrations will continue as
the full effects of the Agreement begin to become apparent. The
question is, to what extent will the Canadian lamentations be felt, and
what lessons will be learned for Canadian politicians who seek
increased liberalization of Canadian procurement markets in the
future?
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